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SOUR GRAPES: THE COMPRIMISING 
EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES’ FAILURE 
TO PROTECT FOREIGN GEOGRAPHIC 
INDICATIONS OF WINES 
Mark Silva*
Abstract: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) is the ªrst signiªcant multilateral 
agreement to expressly provide global protection to geographic indica-
tions (GIs) of wine. Although the United States is a party to this agree-
ment, this Note argues that it has failed to bring domestic legislation in 
conformity with the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement regarding wine. 
While this has beneªted many domestic vintners at the expense of their 
foreign counterparts, this Note also argues that the same failure may 
ultimately result in the exploitation of U.S. vintners as well. This point is 
illustrated by the current situation faced by the Napa Valley Vintners 
Association. Hongye Grape Wine Co., a winery in Beijing, has applied to 
register the GI “Napa Valley” as a trademark for use on wines that will be 
made from Chinese grapes and sold in China. Given the United States’ 
unwillingness to protect foreign GIs domestically, however, this Note 
concludes that in circumstances such as this, the United States cannot 
expect other countries to protect domestic GIs abroad. 
Introduction 
 Many products consumers purchase each day identify themselves 
by referring to the geographic locations from where they originate.1 
Products that typically incorporate geographic phraseology into their 
names include such things as cheeses, wines, and even potatoes.2 This 
                                                                                                                      
* Mark Silva is the Senior Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 See generally Leigh Ann Lindquist, Champagne or Champagne? An Examination of U.S. 
Failure to Comply with the Geographical Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. 
L. 309, 309 (1999). 
2 Dr. Dwijen Rangnekar, Geographical Indications, A Review of Proposals at 
the TRIPS Council: Extending Article 23 to Products Other than Wines and Spirits 
11 (U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev.–Int’l Centre for Trade and Sustainable Develop-
ment, Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/CS_rangnekar.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2004). 
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popular practice, known as identifying products by using geographic 
indications (GIs), is an extremely valuable marketing tool in the pre-
sent global economy.3 It allows products to be identiªed with the 
quality and reputation of a particular geographic region.4 Because of 
the latent value associated with this, countries throughout the world 
are attempting to negotiate trade agreements that ensure when a GI is 
used to identify a product, it accurately represents that product’s true 
place of origin.5
 So far, the most signiªcant of these agreements has been the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement), which provides protection for GIs generally and 
protection for GIs of wine in particular.6
 While the United States is a party to the TRIPS Agreement, it has 
not brought U.S. domestic law into conformity with its obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement, especially with regards to the protection 
of GIs of wines.7 The European Union (EU), which was the driving 
force behind the TRIPS provisions governing GIs, has been stern in 
its criticism of the United States for its failure to abide by the TRIPS 
Agreement.8 The EU’s collective discontent merely echoes that of 
European vintners who have long complained about the use of Euro-
pean GIs such as Champagne and Chablis on U.S. wines.9
 Ironically, however, some U.S. vintners have recently found them-
selves in the shoes of their EU counterparts.10 A winery in Beijing, 
                                                                                                                      
3 See id; Eleanor Meltzer, Worldwide Symposium on Geographical Indications, Geo-
graphical Indications and Trademarks: Intellectual Property Any Way You Slice It, WIPO/ 
GEO/SFO/03/3, at 4 (2003), available at http://www.wipo.org/meetings/2003/geo- 
ind/en/documents/pdf/wipo_geo_sfo_03_3.pdf. 
4 See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 4; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 11. 
5 See Lindquist, supra note 1, at 314–15; See Michael Maher, On Vino Veritas? Clarifying 
the Use of Geographic References on American Wine Labels, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1881, 1883–84 
(2001); Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 11. 
6 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, arts. 22–24, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 309. 
7 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388 (2000); 27 C.F.R. § 4.24 (2003); Lindquist, supra note 1, at 330–
331. 
8 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 315–16. 
9 Carol Emert, Chinese Use of ‘Napa Valley’ on Wine Draws Protest in the U.S., San Francisco 
Chron., Aug. 7, 2003, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/ 2003/08/07/ 
WI66561.DTL (last visited Dec. 6, 2004). 
10 See id; Didier’s, le Portail des bons Vins, California Winemakers Up in Arms over Chinese 
“Napa Valley” Wine, http://www.didiers.net/_news.cfm?ID=578 (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter Didier’s]. 
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Hongye Grape Wine Co. (HGW), has applied to register the term 
“Napa Valley” as a trademark for use on wines that will be made from 
Chinese Grapes and sold in China.11 In response, the Napa Valley 
Vintners Association (NVVA) has ªled actions in Chinese court to 
prevent this registration.12
 This Note discusses whether the United States can protect the GIs 
of domestic vintners like the NVVA, given its current position with re-
spect to the TRIPS Agreement and ongoing resistance to EU pressure 
for greater protection for GIs. Part II provides background on the de-
velopment of GIs and their incorporation into the TRIPS Agreement. 
Part III examines the relevant TRIPS GI provisions and U.S. GI legisla-
tion, analyzing the legislation’s shortcomings with respect to the United 
States’ obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. This Note then brieºy 
discusses the current situation faced by the NVVA as a result of HGW’s 
attempted registration of “Napa Valley” as a trademark. Finally, Part IV 
concludes that the United States needs to change its current position 
on the TRIPS Agreement if it is to be able to maintain a tenable posi-
tion in protecting GIs that domestic vintners use in foreign markets. 
I. Background 
 GIs have long been recognized as an effective method by which 
to identify goods that possess some unique qualities because of envi-
ronmental factors, processing methods, or manufacturing skills spe-
ciªc to the region from where they originate.13 Wine is a quintessen-
tial example of a product that relies on a GI because, as it is well 
known, different environments produce different wine grapes and, 
thus, wines of different characteristics.14
 As particular regions, and their GIs, became associated with de-
sirable products, competitors sought to exploit this recognition by 
marketing their products under the famed GIs.15 Consequently, in an 
effort to protect both consumers and legitimate producers from this 
type of false advertising, regulation of GIs emerged.16
 Because GIs are understood by consumers to denote the origin 
and quality of products, laws prohibiting the use of false GIs are in-
tended to protect consumers from being misled into believing that 
                                                                                                                      
11 See Didier’s, supra note 10; Emert, supra note 9. 
12 See Didier’s, supra note 10; Emert, supra note 9. 
13 See Lindquist, supra note 1, at 312; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 1. 
14 See Maher, supra note 5, at 1884. 
15 See id. at 1884. 
16 See id. at 1885–86; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 13, 14. 
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what they are buying is a genuine product with speciªc qualities, when 
in fact they are getting a mere imitation.17 Thus, the guarantees of ori-
gin provide consumers assurances against deception and confusion.18
 The producer-protection element has its basis in unfair competi-
tion.19 Since the price these products command can depend a great 
deal on where they originated, protection of GIs prevents imitators 
from free-riding on the reputation of genuine products.20 By assuring 
producers of their products’ unique identity, GIs can be used by pro-
ducers as a way to market their products, limit the areas of produc-
tion, and provide monopolistic protection to the regional notoriety.21
 Countries began protecting GIs as early as the 18th century, when 
trade began to expand and the value of GIs became apparent.22 Al-
though some international agreements were consummated on the 
matter, on the whole, GIs received little international protection prior 
to the TRIPS Agreement.23 Moreover, none of the agreements 
speciªcally dealt with wine or spirits.24 The TRIPS Agreement is the 
ªrst attempt at offering global protection for GIs both generally and 
for wine in particular.25
 The protection of GIs for wines was a very controversial issue dur-
ing the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.26 The EU fought hard 
for this protection, pitting it against many of the other major wine 
producing countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in-
cluding the United States.27 In the end, the EU’s persistence resulted 
in a provision which required WTO members to develop laws to pre-
vent the use of GIs on wines that do not originate from the geo-
graphical area indicated.28 Debate still lingers, however, over how 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Maher, supra note 5, at 1885–86; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 13, 14 
18 See Maher, supra note 5, at 1885–86. 
19 Rangnekar, supra note 3, at 14. 
20 Id.; see Maher, supra note 5, at 1885–86. 
21 See Maher, supra note 5, at 1885–86; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 14. 
22 See Maher, supra note 5, at 1883–85; Harun Kazmi, Does It Make a Difference Where 
That Chablis Comes from? Geographic Indications in TRIPS and NAFTA, 12 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 470, 471 (2001). 
23 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 314–15. 
24 Id. at 314 
25 See id.; Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the 
World Trade Organization, 34 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 123, 162 (1995). 
26 See id. at 166; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 310, 315–16. 
27 See Demaret, supra note 25, at 166; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 310, 315–316. 
28 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at arts. 23–24. 
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much protection should be given to GIs that have long been used be-
yond their boundaries.29
 The United States and the EU have been at the forefront of this 
long-standing debate.30 Having one of the most diverse portfolios of 
protected GIs, the EU has continually pushed the United States to 
comply with the TRIPS provisions on GIs since its passage.31 The EU 
has targeted the United States in particular because U.S. vintners con-
tinue to use a signiªcant number of European GIs on wine produced in 
the United States.32 Instead of succumbing to the EU’s pressure, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which included 
provisions that further protected U.S. vintners’ use of European GIs in 
spite of the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement.33 The EU has insisted 
that the U.S. legislation violates the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement, 
but the United States has remained steadfast in its position.34
 Now, years after shrugging off the concerns of the European vint-
ners and passing legislation that undercuts the TRIPS Agreement, the 
United States is facing a situation where it is relying on adherence to 
TRIPS by China, another WTO member, to protect the interests of U.S. 
vintners.35 Because China only recently joined the WTO, it is still in the 
process of modifying a host of domestic laws in order to conform with 
WTO requirements.36 While China has stated its intention to fully com-
ply with its international obligations, including the TRIPS Agreement, it 
is nonetheless an open question as to how China will handle HGW’s reg-
istration of “Napa Valley” as a trademark.37 The result of the NVVA ac-
tions in Chinese court will not be known for a while since Chinese 
courts usually take two years to rule on the validity of a trademark.38
                                                                                                                      
29 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 310. 
30 Id. at 310, 329. 
31 See Lindquist, supra note 1, at 319; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 11. 
32 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 319–20. 
33 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 310, 327. 
34 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 329. 
35 See Didier’s, supra note 10; Emert, supra note 9. 
36 See United States Trade Representative, 2002 Report to Congress on China’s 
WTO Compliance, at 34–35 (2002) [hereinafter USTR Report]. 
37 See id. at 36–37; WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 
at 55, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter WTO Report] 
38 Emert, supra note 9. 
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II. Discussion 
A. Geographic Indications and the TRIPS Agreement 
 The TRIPS Agreement contains three provisions that deal exclu-
sively with GIs.39 Article 22 of the TRIPS Agreement provides general 
protection for GIs, Article 23 provides additional protection for GIs 
for wines and spirits, and Article 24 imposes an obligation on partici-
pating countries to further negotiate to increase protections for GIs 
for wines and spirits.40 In addition, Article 24 establishes exceptions to 
the general prohibitions.41
1. Article 22—Protection of Geographical Indications 
 Article 22 deªnes GIs as “indications which identify a good as 
originating in the territory of a [WTO] Member, or a region or locality 
in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteris-
tic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”42 
The Article requires member countries to provide legal means to pre-
vent the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good 
that indicates or suggests a false GI that would mislead the public as to 
its true geographical origin.43 In addition, members must refuse or in-
validate the registration of a trademark that contains or consists of a GI 
that would mislead the public as to the true place of origin.44
2. Article 23—Additional Protection for Geographic Indications for 
Wines and Spirits 
 Article 23 requires member countries to enact laws that prohibit 
the use of false GIs on wines and spirits, even where the true origin of 
a good is indicated or the GI is accompanied by expressions such as 
“kind,” “type,” “style,” or the like.45 Furthermore, Article 23 allows for 
the refusal or invalidation of trademarks that contain or consist of GIs 
identifying wines or spirits when they do not originate in the place 
indicated.46 Article 23, however, is signiªcantly different from Article 
                                                                                                                      
39 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 22–24; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 316. 
40 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 22–24; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 316. 
41 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 22–24; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 316. 
42 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. art. 23. 
46 Id. art. 23. 
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22 because it does not require that the trademark be misleading for 
the provision to be invoked.47 Rather, it is only in the case of ho-
monymous GIs for wines or spirits that misconception in the public 
eye is considered.48 Finally, Article 23 requires negotiations to be un-
dertaken in the Council of TRIPS (Council) to establish a multilateral 
system of notiªcation and registration.49
3. Article 24—International Negotiations; Exceptions 
 Article 24 explicitly obligates member countries to enter into nego-
tiations aimed at increasing the protection for GIs for wines and spirits, 
and, as a precautionary measure prevents member countries from using 
the exceptions listed in Article 24 as an excuse to avoid further negotia-
tions.50 In addition, in order to protect the status quo in countries that 
provide greater protection for GIs than what is called for under TRIPS, 
Article 24 prohibits member countries from diminishing protection for 
GIs that existed prior to the TRIPS Agreement coming in to force.51
 Article 24 provides several exceptions to the general rules stated 
in Articles 22 and 23.52 First, a member country does not need to pre-
vent the continued use of a GI of another member country identify-
ing wines or spirits if that GI has been used continuously by a national 
of that country for (a) at least ten years prior to April 15, 1994, or (b) 
in good faith prior to that date.53 Second, in the case of a good faith 
application or registration of a trademark which incorporates a GI, 
Article 24 provides that the validity or eligibility will not be prejudiced 
if the trademark is acquired or registered (a) prior to the date of ap-
plication of its provisions, or (b) before the GI has been protected in 
its country of origin.54 Finally, in the case where a GI has become a 
common name for a good, or the GI has become synonymous with 
the customary name of a grape variety within the country, that mem-
ber country does not need to protect the GI.55
 Article 24 also grants the Council the power to review implemen-
tation of these provisions from time to time and allows the Council to 
                                                                                                                      
47 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23; Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 4. 
48 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23; see Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 4. 
49 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23. 
50 Id. art. 24. 
51 Id. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 24. 
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take action (upon agreement) to facilitate and further the objectives 
of the Article.56 Thus, the Council is empowered to actively oversee 
compliance with these provisions.57 This oversight is minimal in prac-
tice, however, because the Council meets infrequently and takes only 
a minor role in resolving disputes.58 As a result, member countries are 
expected to comply with the Article’s provisions and carry out nego-
tiations on their own initiative.59
B. Protection for GIs Under Current U.S. Legislation 
 U.S. legislation, thus far, has fallen woefully short of incorporating 
the broad-based protections outlined in the TRIPS Agreement.60 Al-
though Congress amended U.S. trademark law in 1996 so that it would 
comply with the TRIPS Agreement, it failed to do the same for existing 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) regula-
tions dealing with GIs.61 In fact, not only did Congress fail to amend 
the ATF regulations, but it actually codiªed the portion of the ATF 
regulations that is in direct conºict with the GI provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement.62 The present debate between the EU and the United 
States regarding GIs has its roots in these now codiªed ATF regula-
tions.63
1. 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.24—ATF Regulations on Labeling and 
Advertising of Wine 
 The ATF regulates the use of GIs on wines in the United States 
through its control over labeling and advertising of wines.64 The regu-
lations classify GIs as either generic, semi-generic, or non-generic, de-
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. 
57 See id.; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 318. 
58 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 318. 
59 Id. 
60 See U.S.C. § 5388(c); 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; Lindquist, supra note 1, at 326–27, 330–31. 
61 See U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000). Section 1052 provides that a trademark shall be refused 
if it consists of “a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with 
wines or spirits, identiªes a place other than the origin of the goods and is ªrst used on or 
in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on 
which the WTO Agreement enters into force with respect to the United States.” Id.; see 27 
C.F.R. § 4.24. The relationship between trademarks and GIs is unsettled and will not be 
addressed in this Note. See Rangnekar, supra note 2, at 7. 
62 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
63 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 325. 
64 Id.; see 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.24. 
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pending on the signiªcance of the geographic designation.65 How a 
GI is classiªed is important because the classiªcation determines the 
level of protection the GI will receive.66
 Protection afforded to non-generic and generic GIs appear to be 
consistent with the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement.67 The ATF’s 
prohibition on the use of non-generic GIs is consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement’s general prohibition of GIs that indicate a location other 
than a wine’s true origin.68 In the case of the ATF allowing the use of 
generic GIs, it is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement because such 
GIs have become a common name for a type of wine, and thus, they 
fall within the ambit of exemptions to the general prohibition.69 The 
inconsistencies with the TRIPS Agreement only arise with respect to 
the middle category, what the ATF considers to be semi-generic.70
 The ATF deªnes semi-generic GIs as those names that have re-
tained their geographic signiªcance, but at the same time, in a ge-
neric sense, describe types of wines.71 The ATF allows such semi-
generic designations to be used to designate wines that do not origi-
nate from the location indicated by the GI so long as the actual place 
of origin appears in conjunction with the GI.72 The ATF gives sixteen 
examples of what it considers to semi-generic GIs.73 Fifteen of these 
GIs are European in origin.74 Included among them are the famous 
wine-producing regions of Champagne, Chablis, Burgundy, and Chi-
anti.75 Thus, the ATF allows use of these GIs on American wines made 
                                                                                                                      
65 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
66 See id. 
67 Compare 27 C.F.R. § 4.24, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 23–24 
68 Compare 27 C.F.R. § 4.24, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23. Examples of 
what the ATF considers, among others, to be non-generic include “American,” “Califor-
nia,” “Lake Erie,” “Napa Valley,” “Bordeaux Blanc,” “Bordeaux Rouge,” “Graves,” and “Me-
doc.” See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
69 Compare 27 C.F.R. § 4.24, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 24. Examples of 
geographical terms that the ATF considers as being generic GIs are “Vermouth” and 
“Sake.” See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
70 Compare 27 C.F.R. § 4.24, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 23–24; see 
Lindquist, supra note 1, at 327. 
71 Maher, supra note 5, at 1899; see 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
72 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
73 See id. (listing Angelica, Burgundy, Claret, Chablis, Champagne, Chianti, Malaga, 
Marsala, Madeira, Moselle, Port, Rhine Wine, Sauterne, Haut Sauterne, Sherry, and Tokay 
as semi-generic GIs). 
74 See id. 
75 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; Maher, supra note 5, at 1899. 
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from American grapes so long as the actual place of origin appears in 
conjunction with the semi-generic GI.76
2. Codiªcation of ATF Regulations 
 The U.S. Congress codiªed the ATF’s regulations regarding semi-
generic classiªcation of GIs in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 in re-
sponse to a strong lobbying effort by the U.S. wine industry.77 Like the 
ATF regulations, 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c) provides that semi-generic GIs 
may be used to designate wines of an origin other than that indicated 
by such name if the true place of origin is indicated in direct conjunc-
tion with the GI.78 Furthermore, Section 5388 lists exactly the same 
examples of semi-generic GIs as those listed in the ATF regulations.79
III. Analysis 
A. Shortcomings in the Current U.S. Legislation 
 The inconsistencies between the ATF regulations governing semi-
generic GIs and the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement governing GIs 
of wines are glaring.80 First, Article 23 compels member countries to 
enact laws that prevent the use of GIs for wines not originating in the 
place indicated even where the true origin is indicated in conjunction 
with the GI.81 The framework contemplated by the TRIPS Agreement 
is fairly black and white.82 It divides GIs into two groups: terms that 
are generic and those that are not.83 In light of the purpose of the 
TRIPS Agreement (to offer increased protection for GIs of wines), it 
can only be assumed that GIs that retain geographic signiªcance even 
when they arguably have a generic component fall into the latter 
grouping, and therefore should be prohibited.84 Thus, by allowing 
semi-generic GIs to be used when they appear in conjunction with the 
true place of origin, the ATF regulations are completely at odds with 
the intentions and spirit of the TRIPS Agreement.85 Secondly, the 
                                                                                                                      
76 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
77 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); Lindquist, supra note 1, at 327–29 
78 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c). 
79 See id. 
80 Compare 27 C.F.R § 4.24, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 23–24. 
81 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 23. 
82 See id. arts. 23–24. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 Compare 27 C.F.R § 4.24, with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 23–24. 
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ATF regulations do not incorporate any of the grandfather clauses of 
the TRIPS Agreement which allow the use of GIs only in particular 
circumstances.86 Nor do they have the ten year or good faith re-
quirements.87 Thus, instead of allowing the use of protected GIs in 
limited circumstances, the ATF regulations allow any U.S. vintner to 
use these semi-generic designations.88 The regulations make no dis-
tinctions between a vintner who used such a GI for ªfty years and one 
who began using the GI a month ago.89
 Because the current ATF regulations were in place well before the 
TRIPS Agreement, these inconsistencies existed from the time the 
TRIPS Agreement came into force.90 The negotiations contemplated by 
the TRIPS Agreement along with the regulatory nature of the ATF, 
however, left open, in theory, the possibility of a relatively quick and easy 
resolution between the EU and United States to bring the U.S. regula-
tions into compliance with the international obligations of the TRIPS 
Agreement; the ATF could have simply amended its regulations.91
 This is not the case anymore.92 By codifying the ATF regulations in 
1997, the United States has created a much more pronounced rift be-
tween it and the EU.93 While this legislation was not a departure from 
the status quo, it now makes the status quo much more difªcult to de-
part from.94 That is, the regulations that once could have been easily 
changed by the ATF now require Congressional action because they 
have been codiªed.95 Thus, U.S. compliance with the TRIPS Agree-
ment will be much more difªcult to accomplish.96
 By passing this legislation in spite of the TRIPS mandate that 
member countries enter into negotiations that attempt to increase the 
protection of individual GIs under Article 23, the United States is 
showing that it is disingenuous about complying with its TRIPS obliga-
tions.97 As a result, its actions work to discredit any arguments the 
                                                                                                                      
86 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 24. 
87 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 24. 
88 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24. 
89 See id. 
90 See id; Maher, supra note 5, at 1893–1894. 
91 See 27 C.F.R. § 4.24; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 24; Lindquist, supra note 1, 
at 329. 
92 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); Lindquist, supra note 1, at 329. 
93 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); Lindquist, supra note 1, at 327. 
94 See 26 U.S.C. § 5388(c); Lindquist, supra note 1, at 332. 
95 Lindquist, supra note 1, at 332. 
96 See id. at 327. 
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United States may advance claiming that its current laws are in con-
formity with the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.98 To illustrate 
this point, take the most likely argument that the United States will 
make: the semi-generic GIs listed in the current legislation fall into 
the exception in Article 24 for GIs that have become customary terms 
for particular goods.99 As the ATF regulations and Section 5388(c) 
acknowledge, however, these GIs are far from being simply generic.100 
They contain both a generic component in that they have come to 
identify a type of wine and they contain a non-generic component in 
that they are terms with geographic signiªcance.101 Presented with 
these two competing aspects of a particular GI, if the United States 
was intent on upholding the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement, it would 
not place its thumb on the side of the GIs generic aspect to tip the 
scale in favor of lowering protection.102
B. Hongye Grape Wine Co. 
 Since Chinese law is undergoing a vast makeover to comply with 
its WTO obligations, the laws regulating GIs have not yet settled.103 As 
a result, the attempted registration of “Napa Valley” as a trademark by 
HGW may not be an open and shut case.104
 If China complies fully with its obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, as it says it will, this situation is not likely to pose a terrible 
problem for the NVVA or the United States.105 A strict evaluation of 
this case under the mandates of the TRIPS Agreement will likely yield 
a favorable ruling for the NVVA.106 The fact that Western-style wines 
in general, including Napa Valley wines, are still a fairly new product 
in the Chinese market would preclude a Chinese court from holding 
that Napa Valley wines have become so pervasive in the Chinese wine 
industry, that now, the term “Napa Valley” has fallen into common 
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usage for a type of wine in China.107 Furthermore, none of the grand-
father clause exceptions would apply in this case because this is the 
ªrst known attempt to register or use “Napa Valley” as a name for a 
wine produced outside of the United States using foreign grapes.108
 Even if China were to employ a law regarding GIs that was 
friendly to domestic producers, like the United States, the outcome is 
unlikely to change for much the same reason.109 The justiªcations the 
United States has used with respect to those European GIs that it clas-
siªes as being semi-generic are absent in this case.110 “Napa Valley” 
does not have the generic component in China that terms like Chi-
anti or Champagne could arguably be said to have.111 Unlike the term 
“Napa Valley” in China, terms like Chianti and Champagne have been 
used for a signiªcant length of time in the United States.112
 While either of these two possibilities would produce a satisfac-
tory result for the United States and the NVVA, China may utilize 
regulations with respect to GIs that will lead to incoherent results that 
are contradictory to any semblance of compliance under the TRIPS 
Agreement.113  There are a number of reasons why this may occur.114 
First, Chinese legislation tends to be drafted in vague terms that leave 
interpretive bodies (comprised of Chinese bureaucrats) with 
signiªcant discretion in interpreting laws.115 Second, as a result of the 
ill deªned power of China’s legislative bodies, sometimes overlapping 
and contradictory laws are passed at all levels of government.116 Lastly, 
a point closely related to the ªrst, those that are vested with the broad 
discretion to interpret and implement laws tend not to be neutral.117 
They are inºuenced by a range of extralegal factors, including the 
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political pressure of the Chinese Communist Party, dependence on 
local governments for funding, ªnancial interests in decisions at the 
local level, the pull of personal relationships, and outright corrup-
tion.118 The clear implication of all this is that there is no guarantee 
that China will live up to its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement 
and vindicate the American interests in this case.119 In fact, the con-
ºuence of strong local ties, broad discretion, and contradictory laws 
may result in a cold legal atmosphere for the NVVA.120
 Whatever the chances may be, if China fails to uphold its obliga-
tions under TRIPS and does not protect the GI “Napa Valley,” the 
United States will have to take some form of action if it wants to prevent 
erosion of the NVVA’s interests in China.121 The possible avenues of 
recourse available to the United States include pressuring China to 
comply with TRIPS (just as the EU has pressured the United States) 
and/or submitting the matter to the Council for resolution.122 In either 
case, however, given the cavalier attitude taken in the past by the 
United States in complying with the TRIPS Agreement, the forcefulness 
of the United States’ arguments will be severely limited.123 Credibility 
will naturally depend a great deal on the United States’ adherence to 
the spirit and goals of the TRIPS Agreement.124 Thus, it would be un-
realistic for the United States to expect to pass opportunistic legislation 
to protect its own rights and then turn around and argue that others 
should not do the same.125
Conclusion 
 To this day, the United States position with regard to GIs of wine 
and the TRIPS Agreement has been short-sighted. While many U.S. vint-
ners beneªt from the use of European GIs on their wines today, the tides 
are beginning to turn. As illustrated by HGW’s attempted registration of 
“Napa Valley” as a trademark, it is only a matter of time until the U.S. 
vintners eventually occupy the roles that their European counterparts 
have played for decades. If the Unites States hopes to prevent such a re-
sult, it must show that it is willing to play by the rules that it helped estab-
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lish. The United States must protect the use of foreign GIs in its domestic 
market. If this does not happen, the United States cannot expect, nor 
can it ask, other countries to respect the interests of U.S. vintners abroad. 
